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Summary  Under  the  standard  formulation  of  the  Doctrine  of  Double  Effect,  an  act  is  permis-
sible only  if  it  is  the  result  of  an  intention  to  do  good  and  not  the  result  of  an  intention  to  do
bad. Many  find  that  this  absurdly  ties  the  act’s  permissibility  to  the  agent’s  character  and  not
to features  of  the  act  itself.  In  light  of  such  criticism,  some  philosophers  have  reformulated  the
doctrine so  that  it  holds  that  an  act  is  permissible  given  that  it  results  from  an  intention  to  do
good by  some  agent.  I  argue  that  this  appeal  to  possible  intentions  to  do  good  fails.  There  is
no modal  or  moral  reason  to  privilege  intentions  to  do  good  over  those  to  do  bad,  and  without
privileging  them,  this  version  of  the  Doctrine  of  Double  Effect  leads  to  contradiction.  In  many
scenarios, if  a  possible  intention  to  do  good  is  considered  to  be  sufficient  for  permissibility,  then
in that  same  scenario  a  possible  intention  to  do  bad  should  be  sufficient  for  impermissibility.
However,  one  and  the  same  act  can  have  both  possible  intentions  to  do  good  and  possible  inten-
tions to  do  bad.  Thus,  the  principle  leads  to  the  contradictory  ruling  that  one  and  the  same  act
is both  permissible  and  impermissible.
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MOTS  CLÉS Résumé  Selon  la  formulation  standard  de  la  doctrine  du  double  effet,  un  acte  n’est  admissible
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Licéité
que s’il  résulte  d’une  intention  de  faire  le  bien  et  non  d’une  intention  de  faire  le  mal.  Beaucoup
trouvent  que  cela  lie  de  manière  absurde  la  validité  d’un  acte  au  caractère  de  l’agent  et  non
aux caractéristiques  de  l’acte  lui-même.  À  la  lumière  de  ces  critiques,  certains  philosophes
ont reformulé  la  doctrine  de  sorte  qu’elle  considère  qu’un  acte  soit  permis  s’il  résulte  d’une
intention de  faire  le  bien  par  un  agent.  Je  soutiens  que  cet  appel  aux  intentions  possibles  de
faire le  bien  est  un  échec.  Il  n’y  a  pas  de  raison  modale  ou  morale  pour  privilégier  les  intentions
E-mail address: Christopher.Fruge@rutgers.edu
https://doi.org/10.1016/j.jemep.2018.12.001
2352-5525/© 2018 Elsevier Masson SAS. All rights reserved.
12  C.  Frugé
de  faire  le  bien  par  rapport  à  celles  de  faire  le  mal.  Sans  les  privilégier,  cette  version  de  la
doctrine du  double  effet  conduit  à  la  contradiction.  Dans  de  nombreux  cas,  si  une  éventuelle
intention de  faire  le  bien  est  jugée  suffisante  pour  permettre  la  licéité,  alors,  dans  ce  même
scénario,  une  éventuelle  intention  de  faire  le  mal  devrait  suffire  à  l’inadmissibilité.  Pourtant,
un même  acte  peut  être  lié  à  la  fois  à  des  intentions  de  faire  le  bien  et  à  des  intentions  de  faire
le mal.  Ainsi,  ce  principe  conduit  à  la  conclusion  contradictoire  selon  laquelle  un  même  acte
est à  la  fois  admissible  et  interdit.
© 2018  Elsevier  Masson  SAS.  Tous  droits  re´serve´s.
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ohe  Doctrine  of  Double  Effect  (DDE)  traditionally  holds  that
n  act  is  permissible  only  if  the  agent  intends  its  good  effects
nd  not  its  bad  effects.  However,  this  formulation  leads  to
pparently  absurd  results.  For  instance,  the  principle  holds,
n  the  one  hand,  that  it  is  impermissible  for  a  doctor  to
nject  a  lethal  dose  of  morphine  with  the  intention  of  killing
 patient  whose  pain  is  so  great  that  it  would  be  better
or  her  or  him  to  die.  At  the  same  time,  DDE  holds  that  it
ould  be  permissible  for  the  doctor  to  inject  a  lethal  dose
f  she  or  he  merely  foresaw  but  did  not  intend  the  patient’s
eath.
Some  ethicists  have  tried  to  avoid  these  results  by  revis-
ng  the  doctrine  so  that  an  act’s  permissibility  turns  on
hether  it  could  have  been  the  result  of  an  intention  to
ring  about  its  good  effects  and  not  its  bad  effects.  This
evised  principle  holds  that  an  act  is  permissible  given  that
here  is  a  possible  intention  to  do  good  that  brings  about
hat  act,  even  if  the  act  is  in  fact  a  result  of  an  intention  to
o  bad.  Accordingly,  it  is  permissible  for  the  doctor  to  inject
 lethal  dose  of  morphine  with  the  intention  that  the  suf-
ering  patient  dies,  so  long  as  it  is  possible  that  the  doctor
ould  so  act  without  intending  the  patient’s  death  but  rather
ecause  they  intend  something  good,  such  as  relieving  the
atient  from  pain.
In  this  paper,  I  show  that  this  revised  principle  in  conjunc-
ion  with  a  parallel  principle  that  links  impermissibility  to
ossible  intentions  to  do  bad  leads  to  contradiction.  There-
ore,  proponents  of  the  possible  intentions  version  of  the
DE  must  privilege  possible  intentions  to  do  good  over  those
o  do  bad.  However,  I  argue  that  there  is  no  modal  or  moral
eason  to  do  so.  Therefore,  the  possible  intentions  version
f  the  DDE  must  be  abandoned.
The  usual  understanding  of  the  DDE  is  that  it  holds  that
n  act  is  permissible  only  if  it  results  from  an  intention  to
ring  about  its  good  effects  rather  than  its  bad  effects.  This
llows  that  one  can  foresee  that  some  bad  will  result  as  the
ction’s  side  effect,  so  long  as  one  does  not  intend  to  bring  it
bout.  According  to  this  principle,  surgeons  can  permissibly
ut  out  an  ailing  appendix,  even  though  they  can  foresee
hat  doing  so  will  cause  their  patient  pain,  so  long  as  they
ntend  that  the  patient  be  saved  from  a  burst  appendix  and
o  not  intend  that  the  patient  feel  the  surgery’s  foreseeable
ain.
Let  us  call  this  view  DDE-Actual, because  it  is  formulated
n  terms  of  the  agent’s  actual  intention:
t
tDDE-Actual:  An  act  is  permissible  if  and  only  if
1)  it  is  the  result  of  an  actual  intention  to  bring  about
the  good  effects  of  an  act  and  not  the  result  of  an  inten-
tion  to  bring  about  the  bad  effects  of  the  act—either  as
ends  or  means  to  the  good  effects,
2)  and  conditions  c1, c2,.  .  .cn are  met,  where  condi-
tions  c1, c2,  . .  .  cn are  further  conditions  that  do  not  have
intentionality  as  part  of  their  content—such  as  a  propor-
tionality  condition  between  good  and  bad  or  a  necessity
condition  on  there  being  no  less  harmful  way  of  achieving
the  desired  goal  [1,  p.  43].
Clause  (2)  covers  what  I  call  ‘non-intentionality  involving
onditions’,  and  I  remain  non-committal  as  to  what  they  are.
DDE-Actual  holds  that  an  act  is  permissible  if  and  only  if
ll  of  the  non-intentionality  involving  conditions  are  met  and
he  agent  intends  to  do  good  and  does  not  intend  to  do  bad.
iven  that  an  act  is  permissible  if  and  only  if  it  is  not  imper-
issible,  then  this  version  of  the  DDE  also  holds  that  an  act
s  impermissible  if  and  only  if  one  of  the  non-intentionality
onditions  are  not  met  or  that  act  results  from  an  inten-
ion  to  do  bad.  Therefore,  it  is  sufficient  for  an  act  to  be
mpermissible  that  the  agent  acts  with  an  intention  to  do
ad.  At  least,  all  of  this  is  so  on  the  assumption  that  one  can
ntend  either  good  effects  or  bad  effects,  but  one  cannot
ntend  neutral  effects.  For  simplicity,  I  make  this  assump-
ion,  but  everything  I  say  in  this  paper  can  be  tweaked  to
ccommodate  intending  neutral  effects.
As  stated,  DDE-Actual  is  an  absolutist  prohibition  against
ntending  bad  in  that  if  one  does  not  intend  the  good  effects
f  one’s  action,  then  one  acts  impermissibly—regardless
f  the  benefits  one’s  act  may  bring.  However,  one  might
elieve,  for  instance,  that  an  act  is  permissible  despite  the
act  that  the  agent  intends  the  bad  effects  if  it  is  the  case
hat  the  good  outcomes  of  the  act  enormously  outweighs
he  bad  outcomes.  An  aide  might  intend  to  annoy  the  presi-
ent  by  preventing  them  from  launching  a  nuclear  missile
ut  this  act  might  be  permissible  if  it  saves  many  lives.
e  can  formulate  DDE-Actual  without  invoking  an  absolutist
rohibition:
DDE-Actual  (Non-absolutist):  An  act  is  permissible  if  and
nly  if1)  it  is  the  result  of  an  actual  intention  to  bring  about
he  good  effects  of  an  act  and  not  the  result  of  an  intention
o  bring  about  the  bad  effects  of  the  act—either  as  ends  or
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[7,  p.  57—8].
This  argument  suggests  that  Intentional  Death  Doctor’s
act  is  permissible  if  Foreseen  Death  Doctor’s  act  is  per-Possible  intentions  and  the  doctrine  of  double  effect  
means  to  the  good  effects,  2)  and  conditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are
met.
Or
3)  the  act  is  the  result  of  an  intention  to  bring  about  the
bad  effects  but  conditions  ca,  cb,.  .  .cm are  met,  where  ca,
cb,.  .  .cm are  conditions  not  having  intentionality  as  part  of
their  content.
We  can  think  of  ca,  cb,.  .  .cm as  threshold  conditions  such
that  if  they  are  satisfied  then  so  much  good  is  done  in  a  pro-
portional  and  necessary  manner  that  the  act  is  permissible
even  if  it  results  from  a  bad  intention.  According  to  the  non-
absolutist  version  of  DDE-Actual,  an  act  is  impermissible  if
and  only  if  it  results  from  an  intention  to  do  good  but  one  of
c1,  c2,.  .  .cn is  not  met  or  it  results  from  an  intention  to  do
bad  and  one  of  ca,  cb,.  .  .cm is  not  met.  For  simplicity,  I mostly
consider  absolutist  versions  of  the  DDE,  but  everything  I  say
can  be  tweaked  to  apply  to  non-absolutist  variants.
Many  philosophers  find  DDE-Actual  to  be  absurd  because
there  are  cases  where  two  acts  differ  only  in  the  agent’s
intention,  and  DDE-Actual  rules  that  one  of  them  is  imper-
missible  [2—4].  I  present  some  of  these  cases  below.  For  all
of  them,  it  should  be  assumed  that  they  satisfy  the  abso-
lutist  non-intentionality  involving  conditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn but
not  the  non-absolutist  non-intentionality  involving  condi-
tions  ca,  cb,.  .  .cm,  which  ensures  that  both  the  absolutist
and  non-absolutist  versions  of  DDE-Actual  rule  that  the  act
resulting  from  an  intention  to  do  bad  is  impermissible,  but
the  act  resulting  from  an  intention  to  do  good  is  permissi-
ble.  The  only  relevant  difference  between  the  cases  is  the
difference  in  intention.
One  set  of  cases  revolves  around  lethal  doses  of  pain
relief  medication  [3,5]:
• Intentional  Death  Lethal  Dose:  Patient  is  in  horrendous
pain  such  that  their  death  would  be  better  for  them.
Intentional  Death  Doctor  injects  a  lethal  dose  of  morphine
intending  that  Patient  die  in  order  that  they  be  relieved
from  pain,  thereby  also  foreseeing  that  they  will  die;
• Foreseen  Death  Lethal  Dose:  Patient  is  in  horrendous  pain
such  that  their  death  would  be  better  for  them.  Foreseen
Death  Doctor  injects  a  lethal  dose  of  morphine  intend-
ing  that  Patient  be  relieved  from  pain,  with  the  foreseen
effect  that  they  will  die.
According  to  DDE-Actual,  Intentional  Death  Doctor’s
act—at  least  as  they  intended  it—is  impermissible  because
they  intend  to  produce  the  bad  of  Patient’s  death,  while
Foreseen  Death  Doctor’s  act  is  permissible  because  they
intend  to  produce  the  greater  good  of  relieving  Patient  from
pain.  Many,  however,  think  this  is  absurd.  As  J.J.  Thomson
puts  it:
According  to  [the  DDE],  the  question  whether  it  is
morally  permissible  for  the  doctor  to  inject  a  lethal  drug
turns  on  whether  the  doctor  would  be  doing  so  intend-
ing  death  or  only  intending  relief  from  pain. .  .If  the
only  available  doctor  would  inject  to  cause  the  patient’s
death,  or  is  incapable  of  becoming  clear  enough  about
her  own  intentions  to  conclude  that  what  she  intends  is
only  to  relieve  the  patient’s  pain,  then—according  to  [the
DDE]—the  doctor  may  not  proceed,  and  the  patient  must
therefore  continue  to  suffer.  That  cannot  be  right. .  .I
suggest  that  [a  given  doctor’s intention  in  acting]  has13
no  bearing  on  whether  it  is  morally  permissible  for  her
to  act  [3,  p.  515—6].1
The  acts  only  differ  with  respect  to  the  doctor’s  inten-
ion.  How  can  the  permissibility  of  the  act  of  giving  the  drug
urn  on  the  doctor’s  aims?
Another  set  of  cases  revolves  around  military  strikes:
Intentional  Death  Airstrike:  Intentional  Death  Pilot  bombs
a  munitions  factory  where  there  are  nearby  innocent
civilians  with  the  intent  that  they  die,  foreseeing  that
the  destruction  of  the  factory  will  cripple  the  aggressor
nation’s  war  effort  and  save  many  more  lives;
Foreseen  Death  Airstrike:  Foreseen  Death  Pilot  bombs  a
munitions  factory  where  there  are  nearby  innocent  civil-
ians  with  the  intent  to  cripple  the  aggressor  nation’s  war
effort  and  thereby  save  many  more  lives,  foreseeing  that
the  civilians  will  die.
According  to  DDE-Actual,  Intentional  Death  Pilot’s  act  is
mpermissible—at  least  as  they  intended  it—because  they
ntend  the  civilians’  deaths,  while  Foreseen  Death  Pilot’s
ct  is  permissible  because  they  intend  to  end  the  war  and  in
o  doing  will  save  proportionately  more  lives.  But  many  find
his  result  to  be  absurd.  It  should  not  make  a  difference  to
he  permissibility  of  the  bombing  which  pilot  happens  to  be
ying.  As  James  Rachels  puts  the  objection,  ‘‘A  pure  heart
annot  make  a  wrong  act  right;  neither  can  an  impure  heart
ake  a  right  act  wrong’’  [2,  p.  142].
We  need  not  appeal  to  brute  intuition  alone  in  holding
hat  DDE-Actual  gets  the  wrong  results.  F.M.  Kamm  has  for-
ulated  a  variety  of  ‘Four-Step  Arguments’  that  serve  to
ustify  our  intuitive  judgments  in  the  lethal  dose  for  pain
elief  cases.  The  primary  argument  is  as  follows:
A)  Doctors  may  permissibly  relieve  pain  in  a  patient  (e.g.,
by  giving  morphine),  even  if  they  know  with  certainty
that  this  will  cause  the  death  of  the  patient  as  a  fore-
seen  side  effect,  when  death  is  a  lesser  [bad]  and  pain
relief  is  a  greater  good  for  the  same  person  and  only  the
morphine  can  stop  the  pain.  [This  is  the  Foreseen  Death
Lethal  Dose  case.]
B)  Doctors  may  permissibly  intentionally  cause  other  lesser
[bads]  to  patients  when  these  are  the  necessary  means
to  their  medically  relevant  greater  good  (e.g.,  a  doc-
tor  might  permissibly  intentionally  cause  a patient  pain
temporarily  if  only  this  would  keep  the  patient  from
falling  into  a  permanent  coma).
C)  When  death  is  a  lesser  [bad]  for  a  person,  it  is  not
morally  different  from  other  lesser  [bads].
D)  Therefore,  when  death  is  a  lesser  [bad]  and  pain  relief  is
a  greater  good  for  the  same  person  (just  as  it  is  in  Step
1),  it  is  also  permissible  to  intentionally  cause  death,
or  assist  in  its  being  intentionally  caused,  when  it  alone
can  stop  pain.  (For  example,  we  could  give  morphine,
which  itself  no  longer  relieves  pain,  in  order  to  induce
death.)  [This  is  the  Intentional  Death  Lethal  Dose  case]
21 Quoted in [6]. The editorial changes are FitzPatrick’s.
2 I have made some minor changes for presentational purposes.
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2*)  or  one  of  c1, c2,.  .  .cn is  not  met.4  
issible.  The  DDE  is  formulated  precisely  to  allow  that
he  latter’s  act  is  permissible.  Hence,  it  seems  that  the
roponent  of  the  DDE  must  allow  that  Intentional  Death  Doc-
or’s  act  is  permissible.  But  DDE-Actual  precludes  Intentional
eath  Doctor’s  act  from  being  permissible,  again  getting  the
rong  results.3
DDE-Actual  makes  the  moral  permissibility  of  an  act
epend  on  the  particular  intentions  of  the  agent  who  hap-
ens  to  be  acting.  Many  have  objected  that  it  thereby
onflates  moral  assessment  of  an  act  with  moral  assessment
f  an  agent’s  character  [2,  p.  141].  While  moral  judgment
f  character  is  important,  it  does  not  bear  on  the  permis-
ibility  of  the  act  itself.  In  light  of  such  criticism,  William
itzPatrick  [6,8,9]  has  formulated  a  version  of  the  DDE  that
ppeals  to  possible  intentions  to  do  good  in  order  to  try  and
ie  permissibility  to  the  nature  of  the  act  and  not  that  of
he  agent.  FitzPatrick  understands  permissibility  as  turning
n  whether  the  act  could  have  resulted  from  some  possible
ntention  of  some  agent.  He  says  that  according  to  the  DDE:
An  act  of  the  relevant  type  (e.g.,  bombing  the  munitions
plant)  is  permissible  just  in  case  there  exists  a  justifica-
tion  for  it  in  terms  of  a  sufficiently  worthy  end  that  can
be  pursued  through  so  acting  without  intending  anything
illicit  as  a  means  [6,  p.  320].
As  FitzPatrick  puts  its  elsewhere:
The  DDE. .  .is  best  understood  as  a  constraint  on  the  jus-
tification  of  action, having  to  do  not  with  any  particular
agent’s  actual  intentions  but  with  the  intentions  that
would  be  involved  in  performing  a  certain  type  of  action
for  the  reasons  provided  by  a  proposed  justification  [8,
p.  102].
Similarly,  he  also  says:
The  idea  is  (roughly)  that  it  is  a  condition  of  adequacy
on  any  justification  J  of  action  A  that  a  good  agent  could
act  well  in  performing  A  for  the  reasons  given  in  J  [9,
p.  191].
According  to  FitzPatrick,  an  act  is  permissible  given  that
t  could  have  resulted  from  an  intention  to  do  good.
Let  us  call  this  version  DDE-Possible  and  put  it  as  follows:
DDE-Possible:  A  token  act  is  permissible  if  and  only  if
1)  it  is  possible  that  an  act  of  its  type  be  the  result  of
an  intention  by  some  agent  to  produce  the  good  effects
and  it  not  be  the  result  of  an  intention  to  bring  about  the
bad  effects—either  as  ends  or  means  to  the  good  effects,
2)  and  conditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are  met.
For  the  non-absolutist  version,  we  would  also  add:
Or
3)  there  is  no  possible  intention  to  bring  about  the
good  effects—that  is,  there  are  only  possible  intentions
3 This sort of argument is less plausible in the airstrike cases
ecause it is not the case that all the harms and benefits accrue
o one and the same person.
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to  bring  about  the  bad  effects—but  conditions  ca,  cb,.  . .cm
are  met.4
Just  considering  the  absolutist  version,  DDE-Possible
olds  that  an  act  is  permissible  if  and  only  if  the  non-
ntentionality  involving  conditions  are  met,  and  there  is
ome  possible  intention  to  do  good  that  could  have  led  to
he  action.  An  act  is  impermissible,  according  to  this  prin-
iple,  if  and  only  if  either  the  non-intentionality  conditions
re  not  met  or  it  is  not  possible  that  the  act  results  from  an
ntention  to  do  good.
DDE-Possible  on  either  version  is  crafted  to  avoid  the
lleged  absurdities  of  DDE-Actual.  Intentional  Death  Doc-
or’s  act  of  killing  the  patient  is  permissible  because  there
s  some  possible  agent  with  a  possible  intention  to  do  good,
amely  Foreseen  Death  Doctor.  Intentional  Death  Pilot’s  act
s  also  permissible  because  there  is  some  possible  agent
ith  a  possible  intention  to  do  good,  namely  Foreseen  Death
ilot.  In  applying  DDE-Possible  to  the  pilot  cases,  FitzPatrick
ays:
The  actual  intentions  of  [Intentional  Death  Pilot]
are  irrelevant  to  the  permissibility  of  flying  the
mission.  . .what  matters  is  just  whether  there  is  an
otherwise  sufficient  justification  J  for  flying  such  a
mission.  . .such  that  a good  agent  could  fly  such  a  mis-
sion  for  the  reasons  given  in  J  without  thereby  intending
harm  to  innocents  and  acting  badly.  This  of  course  yields
the  same  verdict  on  permissibility  as  in  the  [Foreseen
Death  Airstrike]  case:  the  mission  against  the  munitions
plant  is  permissible,  period,  for  the  reasons  given  in
the  justification  and  because  a good  agent  could  act  on
those  reasons  without  being  involved  in  bad  intentions
and  acting  badly  [9,  p.  192].
DDE-Possible  gets  the  desired  verdicts  in  the  cases  that
osed  problems  for  DDE-Actual.  However,  DDE-Possible  faces
roblems  of  its  own.
Let  us  just  consider  the  absolutist  version  of  DDE-
ossible.  It  holds  that  a  necessary  condition  on  permissibility
s  that  there  is  a  possible  intention  to  do  good.  This  entails
hat  a  sufficient  condition  for  an  act  to  be  impermissible  is
he  absence  of  any  such  possible  intention  to  do  good.  How-
ver,  the  principle  also  suggests  something  stronger,  namely
hat  possible  intentions  to  do  bad  are  sufficient  for  imper-
issibility:
DDE-Possible*:  A  token  act  is  impermissible  if  and  only  if
1*)  it  is  possible  that  an  act  of  its  type  be  the
result  of  an  intention  by  some  agent  to  produce  the
bad  effects—either  as  ends  or  as  means  to  the  good
effects—and  it  not  be  the  result  of  an  intention  to  pro-
duce  the  good  effects,4 Again, I am assuming there are always good and bad effects of
n action, given that those are the cases where the DDE applies at
ll. And, perhaps idealizing, I am assuming that one must intend
ither good or bad effects when one intends to act.
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Later  in  the  paper  I  show  how  DDE-Possible  leads  to  DDE-
Possible*,  but  first  I  want  to  show  how  their  combination
leads  to  trouble.
DDE-Possible  and  DDE-Possible*  together  lead  to  contra-
diction  in  that  they  allow  one  and  the  same  act  to  be  both
permissible  and  impermissible.  This  is  so  even  in  cases  where
DDE-Possible  is  supposed  to  improve  upon  DDE-Actual.  Take
the  Intentional  Death  Lethal  Dose  case.  DDE-Possible  is  con-
structed  to  allow  that  the  act  in  this  case  is  permissible,
given  that  Foreseen  Death  Lethal  Dose  is  possible  and  thus
there  is  a  possible  intention  to  do  good  behind  the  act.  But
given  that  Intentional  Death  Lethal  Dose  itself  obtains,  then
there  is  a  possible  intention  to  do  bad  behind  the  act,  namely
the  actual  intention  to  cause  death.  Hence,  DDE-Possible*
rules  it  as  impermissible.  We  thus  have  the  contradictory
ruling  that  the  act  both  is  and  is  not  permissible.  The  same
holds  in  the  Intentional  Death  Airstrike  case.  DDE-Possible
rules  that  Intentional  Death  Pilot’s  action  is  permissible
given  that  Foreseen  Death  Pilot  is  a  possible  pilot  with  an
intention  to  do  good  that  results  in  the  act.  But  Intentional
Death  Pilot  acts  with  an  actual  intention  to  do  bad,  and  thus
there  is  a  possible  intention  to  do  bad  that  could  result  in
the  act.  Therefore,  DDE-Possible*  rules  that  the  act  is  imper-
missible,  while  DDE-Possible  rules  that  it  is  permissible.  The
two  principles  lead  to  contradiction.
Perhaps  one  might  object  that  the  real  content  of  the
DDE  is  not  that  one  must  intend  the  good  but  rather  simply
that  one  not  intend  the  bad  [5].  DDE-Possible  would  then
hold  that  an  action  is  permissible  if  and  only  if  it  is  possi-
ble  that  there  is  no  intention  to  do  bad  and  conditions  c1,
c2,.  .  .cn are  met.  But  even  if  DDE-Possible  were  formulated
as  above,  then  DDE-Possible*  would  just  have  to  become  the
slightly  modified  DDE-Possible**  that  holds  that  an  action  is
impermissible  if  and  only  if  it  is  possible  that  there  is  no
intention  to  do  good  or  one  of  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn is  not  met.  And  the
same  cases  of  Intentional  Death  Lethal  Dose  and  Intentional
Death  Airstrike  where  there  are  intentions  to  do  bad  suggest
cases  where  it  is  possible  there  is  no  intention  do  good.  The
pilot  might  have  no  intention  to  help  the  war  effort.  The
doctor  may  only  enjoy  killing.  The  ensuing  arguments  for
DDE-Possible*  equally  serve  as  arguments  for  DDE-Possible**
with  only  the  slightest  of  changes.  I  ignore  the  alternate
DDE-Possible  and  DDE-Possible**  in  what  follows.
On  pain  of  allowing  for  contradiction,  the  proponent
of  DDE-Possible  must  require  that  intentions  to  do  good
are  privileged  over  those  to  do  bad.  They  must  deny  DDE-
Possible*  by  holding  that  possible  intentions  to  do  good  make
a  difference  to  permissibility,  whereas  possible  intentions
to  do  bad  do  not.  But  possible  intentions  to  do  good  cannot
have  such  an  asymmetric  relevance  over  possible  intentions
to  do  bad.  Defending  this  claim  is  the  task  for  the  rest  of
the  paper.  First,  I  argue  that  intentions  to  do  good  are  not
modally  privileged  over  those  to  do  bad.  Second,  I  argue
that  they  are  not  morally  privileged,  or  at  least  proponents
of  DDE-Possible  have  given  us  no  reason  to  think  so.
As  for  modal  status,  a  given  act  could  possibly  result
from  both  intentions  to  do  good  and  to  do  bad.  Moreover,
in  many  cases  the  intention  to  do  bad  is  modally  closer  than
the  intention  to  do  good.  Take  Intentional  Death  Airstrike.  If
this  case  is  actual,  then  there  is  a  possible  world  described
by  Foreseen  Death  Airstrike  where  the  same  type  of  act  is
the  product  of  an  intention  to  do  good.  But  there  is  also  a
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ossible  world  where  there  is  an  intention  to  do  bad  lying
ehind  this  type  of  act,  namely  the  world  of  Intentional
eath  Airstrike.  Indeed,  this  case  is  actual  relative  to  itself,
ence  the  nearest  world  with  an  intention  to  do  bad  is  much
loser  than  the  nearest  world  with  an  intention  to  do  good.
he  same  reasoning  holds  for  the  Intentional  Death  Lethal
ose  case  and  for  any  case  where  the  actual  intention  is  one
o  do  bad.
There  is  no  modal  reason  to  privilege  only  intentions  to  do
ood,  but  might  there  be  a  moral  reason  to  privilege  them?
et  us  return  to  the  motivation  for  positing  DDE-Possible.
itzPatrick  holds  that  possible  intentions  to  do  good  reveal  a
ustification  for  the  act,  and  such  a  justification  is  necessary
nd  sufficient  for  permissibility:
The  DDE  does  not  in  fact  link  the  moral  permissibility  of
an  act  with  the  token  intentions  with  which  a  given  agent
would  be  acting.  Rather,  it  links  the  permissibility  of  a
certain  type  of  act  with  the  existence  of  a  justification  in
terms  of  a  sufficiently  worthy  end  that  can  be  pursued
through  so  acting  without  intending  anything  illicit  as
means  [6,  p.  319].
In  terms  of  the  Intentional  Death  Airstrike  case,  Fitz-
atrick  believes  that  although  the  pilot  may  have  acted  with
ad  character  [8,  p.  110], there  still  exists  a  sufficient  justifi-
ation  for  the  bombing  in  terms  of  ‘‘its  military  significance,
uch  that  one  could  so  act  for  the  justifying  end  without
ntending  the  deaths  of  innocents’’  [6,  p.  320].
FitzPatrick  spells  out  the  connection  between  justifica-
ion,  permissibility,  and  intentions  to  do  good  by  way  of  the
ollowing  argument:
a justification  for  an  action  is  adequate  only  if  a  good
and  well-informed  agent  could  act  well  (i.e.,  at  least
not  act  badly)  in  performing  the  action  because  of  that
justification  for  it;
intending  significant  harm  toward  innocents  as  a  means  or
end  is  deeply  morally  problematic  as  such,  which  typically
makes  acting  on  such  an  intention  constitute  acting  badly;
so,  an  adequate  justification  of  action  typically  cannot
be  such  that  an  agent  who  performed  the  action  because
of  that  justification  would  be  engaging  in  the  intention
of  significant  harm  toward  innocents  as  a means  or  as  an
end;
there  is  thus  a  constraint  on  the  justification  of  action
such  that  an  action  typically  cannot  be  justified  (shown
to  be  permissible)  by  showing  it  to  be  an  efficient  means
to  a  good  end  in  cases  where  the  action  constitutes  such
a  means  precisely  by  virtue  of  being  significantly  harmful
to  innocents  [8,  p.  102—5].
The  first  premise  holds  that  in  most  cases  it  is  a  nec-
ssary  condition  on  permissibility  that  there  is  a  potential
ustification  for  the  action  such  that  the  agent  could  act  in
ccordance  with  good  character  by  acting  on  that  justifica-
ion.  Intending  to  do  bad  is  such  that  in  most  circumstances
ne  cannot  act  on  an  intention  to  do  bad  while  acting  with
ood  character.  Thus,  barring  exceptional  circumstances,  a
ustification  for  an  action  cannot  involve  an  intention  to  do
ad.  Hence,  in  normal  circumstances  an  action  is  impermis-
ible  if  there  is  no  justification  that  does  not  appeal  to  an
ntention  to  do  bad.
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While  this  argument  officially  supports  the  claim  that
 possible  intention  to  do  good  is  necessary  for  permis-
ibility,  it  is  plausible  to  suppose  that  FitzPatrick  thinks
hat  a  possible  intention  to  do  good  is  sufficient  for  per-
issibility  in  conjunction  with  the  satisfaction  of  various
on-intentionality  involving  conditions,  such  as  proportion-
lity  and  necessity.  Otherwise,  his  view  would  not  establish
hat  it  is  ever  permissible  for  a  doctor  to  give  a  suffering
atient  a  lethal  dose  of  morphine,  which  is  supposed  to  be
he  benefit  of  his  view  over  that  of  the  traditional  version
f  the  DDE.  Therefore,  I  understand  FitzPatrick’s  view  to
e  that  actions  are  permissible  if  and  only  if  there  is  an
dequate  justification  for  them,  and  a  justification  is  ade-
uate  if  and  only  if  it  is  such  that  non-intentionality  involving
onditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are  met  and  also  it  appeals  only  to
ossible  intentions  to  do  good  and  not  intentions  to  do  bad.
In  light  of  this,  I  want  to  offer  a  slightly  reconstructed
ersion  of  the  above  argument  for  the  claim  that  inten-
ions  to  do  good  are  sufficient  for  permissibility,  given  that
onditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are  met.
(i’)  Given  that  non-intentionality  involving  conditions  c1,
c2,.  .  .cn are  met,  a  justification  for  an  action  is  ade-
quate  if  a  good  and  well-informed  agent  could  act  well
(i.e.,  at  least  not  act  badly)  in  performing  the  action
because  of  that  justification  for  it.
(ii’)  Intending  significant  benefit  toward  innocents  as  a
means  or  end  is  morally  commendable  as  such,  which
typically  makes  acting  on  such  an  intention  constitute
acting  well.
iii’)  So,  given  that  conditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are  met,  an  ade-
quate  justification  of  action  typically  can  be  such  that
an  agent  who  performed  the  action  because  of  that
justification  would  be  engaging  in  the  intention  of  sig-
nificant  benefit  toward  innocents  as  a  means  or  as  an
end.
I  believe  that  FitzPatrick  would  accept  (i’)  and  (ii’),  and
herefore  also  (iii’).  With  the  two  new  premises  (i’)  and  (ii’),
e  conclude  that  if  the  non-intentionality  involving  condi-
ions  on  permissibility  are  met,  then  a  possible  intention  to
o  good  is  typically  sufficient  for  justification  and  therefore
ermissibility.
However,  the  problem  with  this  argument  is  that  there
s  a  parallel  argument  for  the  conclusion  that  a  possible
ntention  to  do  bad  is  sufficient  for  the  impermissibility
f  an  action.  If  an  act  is  justified—in  the  sense  of  having
 sufficient  set  of  reasons  for  its  permissibility—because
here  is  a  possible  agent  who  could  undertake  the  action
hile  intending  the  good  effects  and  not  the  bad  effects,
hen  it  is  unclear  why  an  act  would  not  be  unjustified—in
he  sense  of  having  a  sufficient  set  of  reasons  for  its
mpermissibility—because  there  is  a  possible  agent  who
ould  undertake  the  action  while  intending  the  bad  effects.
or  presentational  clarity,  let  us  call  an  ‘anti-justification’
 set  of  reasons  sufficient  for  an  act  to  be  unjustified  and
ence  impermissible.Why  might  we  think  that  there  are  such  things  as  anti-
ustifications  that  can  involve  intentions  to  do  bad?  Well,  let
s  consider  how  FitzPatrick  connects  justification  to  permis-
ibility  and  intention:
n
‘
b
tC.  Frugé
It  is  part  of  the  concept  of  a  practical  justification  for
action  that  an  adequate  justification  would  be  one  that
an  otherwise  good  person  could  act  on  without  thereby
acting  badly. If  a  proposed  justification  failed  this  condi-
tion,  and  its  being  taken  seriously  and  acted  upon  would
involve  an  otherwise  good  agent  in  something  morally
problematic  enough  that  she  will  thereby  be  acting
badly,  then  in  what  sense  could  it  seriously  be  thought  to
be  an  adequate  justification?  The  whole  point  of  a  prac-
tical  justification  is  to  show  that  the  action  in  question
is  one  that  could  legitimately  be  pursued  for  the  reasons
given  in  the  justification  [8,  p.  102].
A  justification  is  a  set  of  reasons  that  shows  the  action
an  be  performed  with  good  character  and  produces  a  posi-
ive  outcome  in  the  ways  specified  by  the  non-intentionality
nvolving  conditions.  An  intention  to  do  good  is  a  feature
f  acting  well  and  hence  not  acting  badly.  A  permissible
ction  is  one  that  could  be  done  while  acting  well,  thus
 permissible  action  is  one  that  could  be  done  with  good
ntention.
Yet,  by  this  same  token  an  anti-justification  would  consist
n  a  set  of  reasons  that  shows  the  action  can  be  performed
y  a generally  bad  agent  who  acts  badly  in  acting  for  the
easons  constituting  the  anti-justification.  If  a  bad  agent
ould  have  an  intention  to  do  bad  in  performing  a  certain
ct,  then  that  counts  morally  against  that  act.  Whatever
he  intentions  of  the  actual  agent  who  performs  the  act,
e  appeal  to  a  possible  agent’s  intentions  for  the  unjus-
ification  of  the  act  itself.  That  there  is  a  possible  agent
ith  such  an  intention  shows  that  the  act  can  be  done
ith  bad  character  and  therefore  has  moral  reasons  against
t  such  that  the  act  is  unjustified  and  hence  impermissi-
le.
Given  the  concept  of  an  anti-justification,  we  can  mirror
itzPatrick’s  defense  of  the  DDE-Possible  in  order  to  support
DE-Possible*:
The  DDE-Possible*  does  not  in  fact  link  the  moral  imper-
missibility  of  an  act  with  the  token  intentions  with  which
a  given  agent  would  be  acting.  Rather,  it  links  the  imper-
missibility  of  a certain  type  of  act  with  the  existence  of
an  anti-justification  in  terms  of  either  an  end  that  is  not
sufficiently  worthy  or  a  sufficiently  worthy  end  that  can
be  pursued  through  so  acting  while  intending  something
illicit  as  means.
This  constitutes  the  claim  that  given  that  the  end  is  suffi-
iently  worthy,  and  therefore  clause  (2*)  of  DDE-Possible*  is
ot  satisfied,  then  an  act  is  impermissible  given  clause  (1*)
s  satisfied.
To  bring  out  the  analogy  further,  we  can  construct
n  argument  linking  anti-justification  and  impermissi-
ility  that  mirrors  the  argument  linking  permissibility
o  justification  that  we  constructed  on  behalf  of  Fitz-
atrick.  To  make  the  mirror  image  argument  we  take
remise  (ii)  from  FitzPatrick’s  original  argument,  and  for
he  other  claims  we  simply  substitute  terms  for  their
ormative  opposites—‘anti-justification’  for  ‘justification’,
anti-justified’  for  ‘justified’,  ‘impermissible’  for  ‘permissi-
le’,  ‘bad’  for  ‘good’,  ‘badly’  for  ‘well’,  and  so  on.  Here  is
he  argument:
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(i*)  Given  that  conditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are  met,  an  anti-
justification  for  an  action  is  adequate  if  a  bad  and
well-informed  agent  could  act  badly  (i.e.,  at  least  not
act  well)  in  performing  the  action  because  of  that  anti-
justification  for  it.
(ii*)  Intending  significant  harm  toward  innocents  as  a
means  or  end  is  deeply  morally  problematic  as  such,
which  typically  makes  acting  on  such  an  intention  con-
stitute  acting  badly.
(iii*)  So,  given  that  conditions  c1,  c2,.  .  .cn are  met,  an  ade-
quate  anti-justification  of  action  typically  can  be  such
that  an  agent  who  performed  the  action  because  of
that  anti-justification  would  be  engaging  in  the  inten-
tion  of  significant  harm  toward  innocents  as  a  means
or  as  an  end.
If  acting  on  a  set  of  reasons  would  constitute  the  agent
acting  badly,  that  is  sufficient  for  that  set  of  reasons  to  form
an  ant-justification  for  the  action.  An  intention  to  do  bad
is  normally  such  that  acting  on  it  would  constitute  acting
badly.  Hence,  in  normal  circumstance  an  adequate  anti-
justification  is  one  that  appeals  to  a  possible  intention  to
do  bad,  and  therefore  the  presence  of  a  possible  intention
to  do  bad  is  sufficient  for  impermissibility.  This  is  enough  to
generate  the  contradiction  with  DDE-Possible.
If  possible  intentions  to  do  good  are  supposed  to  track
moral  reasons  for  an  action,  then  possible  intentions  to  do
bad  equally  track  moral  reasons  against  an  action.  The  rea-
soning  supporting  DDE-Possible  also  supports  DDE-Possible*,
but  the  two  lead  to  contradiction.  Therefore,  it  appears
that  DDE-Possible  should  be  abandoned.  At  the  very  least,
the  proponent  owes  us  an  explanation  as  to  why  there  is  a
relevant  moral  asymmetry  between  intentions  to  do  good
and  those  to  do  bad.  I  am  skeptical  that  there  is  one  to  be
found.
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